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ADMINISTRATION OF PLANNING IN LESOTHO
A Case-Study : the Ramabanta's - Seraonkong Road
INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATION
Since it is understood that this will be the first of a few papers to be presented
to this programme of seminars, it is intended that it serve the purpose of a some-
what simple introduction to the research I am carrying out in Lesotho. The.focus
of that research is concerned with the processes, machinery and administration of
development planning in Lesotho. 'Development planning1 is interpreted, not as
the five-yearly preparation of a national plan, nor in orthodox terms involving
a systematic process'of research - preparation - formulation - review of programmes
and plans, but in a somewhat broader and less formalistic sense, to cover those
tasks which the Central Planning Office, the ministerial planning units, various
planning committees etc. do in fact undertake; and this includes a rather more
fragmentary list of functions such as the preparation of the annual capital budget,
preparation of projects for donor assistance personnel, processing of scholar-
ships, negotiations with visiting aid missions, etc.
If one accepts Bernard Schaffer's view that "development administration is about
development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there
are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them" and in
consequence, using A.L. Adu's words, "the present generation of politicians and
administrators is bound to operate under conditions of uncertainty, of experiment-
(2)
ation and of insecurity" secondly, that administrative development has been
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(-1) Bernard Schaffer, The Administrative Factor, Papers in Organisation,
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(2) A.L. Adu, The Administrator and Change, in Anthony H. Rweyemamu and Goran
Hyden (eds.), A. Decade of Public Administration in Africa, Nairobi, East
African Literature Bureau, 1975, p.23.
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something of a 'missing ingredient* in the development planning of many
countries ; and thirdly, that in a very small, poor and dependent country,
classified by the U.N. as one of the least developed of the developing countries,
problems are likely to be intensified; and, in addition, when one discovers that
senior government officers are fully aware of, and willing to discuss, weaknesses
in the administrative system; one realises that the somewhat naive-agreSsive
personal need to justify one's research by building up an impressive body of
1
 evidence to prove that the system is malfunctioning, becomes redundant. In
"these circumstances,.one tries, through one's research,, rather to clarify and
analyse, and occasionally to communicate and advise.
In this paper, I have presented an uncomplicated case study, but one which I
hope will give some insight into the tasks undertaken by the planning machinery,
- and will illustrate the kinds of problems and situations which arise. The s
information has been gathered principally from correspondence and documents
in the files of the Central. Planning Off ice (CPO) and Community Development
Office - which includes the functions of the former Food Aid Programme Office
(FAPO), and from interviews. , ....
THE CASE STUDY . . .
Senonkong is a mountain village about 110 kilometres from Maseru. In the area
there are trading and mission stations, schools receiving World Food Programme
food through transport provided by the Save the Children Fund, a government
clinic, a police post and a small tourist lodge. Nearby is the spectacular .
(630 foot) Malotsunyane (Lebihan) Falls, which together with fishing and general
scenery makes it an area of considerable tourist potential. The area also has
potential for wool and mohair production, and wheat, peas and beans grow well. V
A second impressive waterfall in the vicinity has been identified as a possible
site for a hydro-electric scheme, and the Lesotho Bank. has., for. some time been
interested in building a hotel and developing it as a tourist centre. ^
In the late 1950's a tractor was transported, partly by sled, over the mountains
to Semonkong, and this remained the only motorised vehicle to reach the area
until 1971. Until that year, the only links with the outside world were "bridle
paths and an air link with Maseru, started in 1952. In 1971 an extremely rough
(3) Donald C. and Alice B. Stone, Creation of Administrative Capability: The
Missing Ingredient in Development Strategy, Paper at Conference on Strategy
for Development, Jan Smuts House, 1974.
x References have not been attached to this paper, but should there by any
queries, I shall make them available at the seminar.
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45 kilometre track was completed by local villagers, joining Semonkong to
Raraabanta's, a small village from which there are two poor standard roada-'to
Haseru.
The need for a road had been recognised by the Government, and as early as 1967
a project memorandum was put forward for British financing. This memorandum
proposed a road coming from the south - from Mohales Hoek to Mafeteng through
the Ribaneng Valley to Semonkong - hereafter called the southern route. The
British agreed to grants of R25.OOO for surveying the road and R250,00O for
building operations during the financial year 1968/9. Work commenced and
reached a point south of the Ribaneng Valley, before being called to a halt
at a point of no significance. Continuation was scheduled for the first
three years of the First Five Yuar Plan (1970-75) at an estimated further cost of
(2) .
R165,OOON , and accordingly - if a little belatedly - in early 1971 Lesotho
requested the British Government to provide the money for the completion of(3)the road to Semonkong. By this stage, the British had grown dubious about
the utility of the road, and they began sending queries to CPO, such as a request
(4)
for a traffic count. The CPO replied to this that it would be a senseless
exercise to conduct on a road that not only went nowhere but of which part was
inaccessible since no bridge had been constructed over a major river. During
the course of the year the British did give approval in principle, but then soon
after decided to shelve continuation of the road. Two reasons were given for
this: firstly, there were financial constraints, and secondly, the British wanted
to await the results of a national transportation study being carried out by
uct
(7)
Stellenbosch University. This delay proved unprod ive since the research
team ran out of money and the Study never materialised.
The people of the Semonkong area, however, were not interested in the southern
route. Although they had been informed about the intended road from the south,
their most important links were with Maseru, and in their view it would-be
advantageous to build a road which linked them with the capital and not with the
south. With the advice of a foreman from the Food Aid Office, who acted without
his headquarters knowledge, the villagers set about constructing their own rough
track (along what I shall call the villagers1 route) which they completed by the
(8)
middle of 1971, and which enabled a vehicle to reach Semonkong for the first time.
In view of the community's enthusiasm for the road, FAPO instructed its surveyor
to report on the track and what would be required to improve it. His report
stated that it was of a very poor standard and extremely dangerous and should be
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used only by vehicles attached to a construction unit. To bring this road up
to a standard suitable for four-wheel drive vehicles, he proposed the hiring for
three months of compressors and bulldozers and other accessories, at a total cost
of RIO,000 (this was later re-costed at R13.000)/ '
In November 1971, FAPO wrote to the Cabinet Office, enclosing the surveyor's
report and mentioning that at a later date the track could be brought up to the
standard of a Food Aid access track, at the cost of a further R17,000 (which
would include a low-level river crossing). FAPO asked the Cabinet Office for
a policy decision on the continuation of the southern road before it could approach
the British - who would be unwilling to assist with the villagers1 road when they
had already been requested to help with the other - or the Americans. FAPO also
recommended that the southern route be "shelved completely", as it had no popular
support and no great economic advantage over the villagers' road. FAPO would
also not be in a position to approach food donors for assistance with food-for-
work labour, until it had assurances from the government that it would obtain
financial assistance for the machinery. • (A copy was sent to the CPO).
By this Btage the villagers had further shown their interest by forming a committee
which collected R252 from among themselves, to which the Archbishop donated R100,
St. Leonard's Mission R150 and the Anglican Mission R50. In December the Prime
Minister expressed support for this road, particularly as he wished to hold a
pitso in Semonkong, and he contributed R500 to be spent on 20 workers at 30 cents
each per day, and 2 foremen at 50 cents each per day, to work on the road until
the money was used up.
Cabinet Office agreed to the FAPO suggestion to call a meeting of interested parties
(copy to CPO) and did so on 12 January 1972. The meeting decided not to alter the
plans to construct the southern road, since it had already been approved for
funding by the UK, had been programmed for 1972, and the people along the*.planned
route were anticipating it and should not be disappointed. But in addition it
was decided that the RIO,000 required for machinery in support of food aid labour
on the villagers' road should be sought from a donor other than the U.K. It was
estimated that the useful life of the track would be about 4 years, and thereafter,
it was thought, traffic to and from Semonkong would find it easier and more
economical to use the southern road. (Copies of the record of the meeting were
(13}
sent to CPO).V *
Meanwhile on 10 January 1972, a Catholic Father stationed near Semonkong, on behalf
of the committee, sent an application for a United States self-help proiefct to the
Ministry of Works (with copies to the CPO and the US Embassy). That Ministry is
in fact responsible for larger-scale road projects than those generally dealt with
under self-help applications. On 2 February 1972, CPO wrote to Works to ask
whether it approved the
took.no further action.
(14)
 project. It appear that there was no reply, and CPO
On 24 April 1972, FAPO, referring to all the correspondence copied to CPO, and to
the meeting under the Senior Permanent Secretary in Cabinet Office (mentioned
above), requested CPO to advise it on a suitable donor and it enclosed a
memorandum setting out some background to the project. As FAPO falls under
the Cabinet complex of departments, the Cabinet Planning Unit wrote to FAPO and
C pointed out that all requests to CPO should be routed through the Planning Unit. '
The request was then sent to the Planning Unit , (with a copy to CPO) and the
Planning Unit conveyed this to CPO, urging an early reply.
A full year passed* by which stage Catholic Relief Services had agreed and
scheduled in its annual programme to provide food for 200 workers and a foreman,
conditional on the government obtaining the finance for the necessary machinery. '
As CPO had still not responded, FAPO wrote to the US Embassy, enclosing a memorandum
giving background information and expressing the local enthusiasm for the project.
FAPO said that if the Embassy would state that it might be possible to find funds,
(18)it would submit a formal application to CPO; The US Embassy replied that it
had received a copy of the Catholic Father's application to the Ministry of Works,
but had not yet received an application from CPO. It suggested FAPO check the
status of the project with CPO or Works. "If Government approves the project we
will immediately put it in the queue of approved projects for which we will attempt
719}
to find funding." (Copy to CPO).1'* '
FAPO now wrote to CPO, pointing out that it was 16 months since they had requested
advice, and that the state of the track was deteriorating and becoming more dange-
rous, and asking whether CPO would support the project. In October 1973 the
matter was raised in Parliament, and the Minister explained why the southern road
(21) . . .
had come to a halt. That same month the District Administrator of Maseru
called a series of meetings at the main villages along the villagers1 route and
raised a further R300 from them. He wrote to all government departments including
FAPO and CPO and requested most urgently assistance with the road and with the
causeway over the largest river which could not be crossed during the rainy season.
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Thu,s at various stages this project had received the support of the Prime Minister,
the Senior Permanent Secretary, FAPO, the District Administrator of Maseru, the
lopal Missions, the Archbishop, Catholic Relief Services, the US Embassy and the
local people who had contributed both labour and money. Yet there was still no
response from the CPO.
' i ' ' - " •
On I March 1974, FAPO, reminding CPO of the requests of April 1972 and August 1973,
and explaining that it was understood that a German aid mission that was visiting
Lesotho might be interested in financing the road, asked CPO to raise the matter .-.
(23)
with them. There is no evidence that CPO has ever replied to that. . .
There are some cogent reasons why the Central Planning Office may have been un-
willing to support the villagers1 road project. Firstly, there was the southern ^
road which was half completed, and had received British approval in principle; it
may have felt that the chances of the southern road being completed would be com-
promised were the British to discover that it had no popular support, or were they
to realise that the government had plans to support a second road project to the
same place. la this respect the Cabinet Office decision was unhelpful, because
even if CPO went to another donor for support of the other road, the word would
almost certainly reach the ears of the High Commission. Even if Cabinet Office
had accepted the FAPO suggestion to "shelve completely" the southern road, the
CPO would have been put in the somewhat embarrassing position of informing a donor
that the money which had gone into building a road into the middle of nowhere
had resulted from the mistaken judgement of the government. Secondly, there was
a period of delay in which the CPO and the British were waiting for the results of f
the Stellenbosch Transportation Study which was intended to determine a national
order of priorities for road building. As has been mentioned, this eventually
failed to materialise. No sooner had this failed than another donor was found
who was willing to fund a transportation study to be undertaken by a firm of
consultants. So once again the CPO was in a position of not wanting to make
decisions on any road building until the consultants1 report was received.
That the potential of Semonkong as an area for development was in the minds of CPO
staff - at least from time to time - is clear: the southern road was included in
the First Plan, prepared by the CPO; and when the consultants1 draft report arrived,
the CPO in pointing out certain weaknesses, said that it failed to relate roads to
project areas anil gave as one example the road to Semonkong about which the report
-7-
(24)had failed to mention tourism and'electricity. Further, when the African
Development Bank informed the Lesotho Government that it was interested:,,in funding
a road project in Lesotho, the CPO indentified the Ramabanta's-Semonkong Road, i.e.
the villagers' road, "as the most obvious road qualifying for their assistance".
_ "It will have a large impact da the lives of the villagers (rural development); it
_ -
 : leads to the site of the proposed hydro-electric scheme aimed at decreasing Lesotho1
(25)bar'-- dependence on the RSA." (Rural development and decreasing dependence on South
Africa are two of the criteria used by the ADB in deciding on projects for finan-
cing.) This was taken up with the ADB and consultants requested. Probably
. , because this request had been put up to the ADB, which the CPO considered the most
,.,.,,,.: appropriate donor, it would not have accepted FAPO's suggestion to raise it with
£,;,„.___. the Germans, whom CPO felt should be requested to assist in other fields.
The final consultants1 report, which took into account the remarks of the CPO, notes
in connection with the proposed road to Semonkong, the tourist potential, the hydro-
electrical potential, the substantial population and the wool and mohair possibili-
ties, and mentions the very poor condition of the road, the difficult climbs,
hairpin bends and sharp ascents and descents. It proposed three alternative
standards for the road costing R3,2 million, Rl,8 million and R.676,000 from Roma
(27) .
to Ramabanta's to Semonkong. The CPO chose to negotiate on the most expensive
of the three and included it in its draft Second Five Year Plan proposals, placed
before a conference of donors held in April 1975. The ADB agreed to undertake
a detailed feasibility study of this road and one from Leribe to Butha Buthe to
Oxbow at a combined cost of $1 million, for which a loan agreement would be signed.
The ADB delegate to the conference also indicated that his Bank would consider
: (29)
assisting with the building of the road, once the studies had been completed. f
Thus barring serious hitches, it is possible that a study will be undertaken in the
next year or two and that a good gravel road might be built two years after that,
thus bringing the road to Semonkong in 1979 or 1980.
The case study illustrates numerous points, many of which are obvious, but some of
which may be worth mentioning.
(a) In discussing the case study, an officer in FAPO said:
I feel that the CPO don't appreciate the pressures of local leaders -
they are insulated from local pressures and operate at a higher level
of planning. They should operate at a higher level, but they should
have contact and understanding of the pressures as exerted by local
leaders.(30)
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This does afford an example of the difference in the nature of pressures which
'contact1 bodies, more particularly contact agents such as community development
officers and extension agents, face, from those which the CPO confronts. .
(b) It provides a particularly serious example of a project for which local support
had been demonstrated, and of which the CPO failed to take advantage. The wider
support which the villagers1 road received has been mentioned *- yet the CPO remained
unmoved.
(c) It demonstrates the problem of differing times scales* The local community,
their enthusiasm having been excited, wanted to build the road immediately* Though
the standard of the road would be poor, it would have been completed in three months.
( The CPO, on the other hand, firstly (in fulfilment of the requirements of rational
decision-making) wanted to obtain the results of a comprehensive transportation
survey so as to be able to determine the national priority rating of the road;
secondly, needed to identify a specific donor who would be interested in that
particular type of project; thirdly, selected a high standard road (which is
necessary if one wants to raise substantially the number of tourists, and will
reduce vehicle and road maintenance costs) which in turn requires a full engineering
study. The self-help project would have been constructed - including a delay in
US approval - by the middle of 1972. The good road, as has been noted, might be
completed by 1979. This means a delay of 7 years. Although this case is an
extreme example, the problem of community enthusiasm either waning before confirma-
tion and support arrive or simply being disappointed because there are insufficient
, resources for the project, arises regularly. The issue is quite often complicated
further by the community commencing work on a project, without the approval of FAPO
or CPO, but in order to force their hand.
(d) The case study illustrates the type of difficulty which arises inconsequence
of government having established no policy on or machinery for supervising rural
development. Thus at various stages the church, the village committee, FAPO, the
District Administrator, the Ministry of Works became involved in the attempts to get
the villagers' road moving. As one person put it:
There is a general lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what in
the provision of support services for development in rural areas... This
leads to lack of coordination of effort, overlapping of activity and very
weak planning and programming at the district level.(31)
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(e) It highlights a few points about costs of projects. Excluding food aid
which had been approved by a donor, the self-help project would have required
R13.000 from the US Embassy Self Help Fund, and a further R17.000 to bring it
up to the standard of a FAPO access track, i.e. a total of R30,000, obtainable
as a grant. In comparison, the total cost of the high standard gravel road
(including say two-fifths of the expense of the engineering study) will amount
to approximately R3.5 million, and this will be on loan. While it is easy to
be wise after the event, one can see now that the self-help project which would
have cost less than II of the proposed road, should not therefore have compromised
its acceptibility to a donor, would have provided the village with improved access
/-• to Maseru and would have facilitated government, mission, and trader contact with
" Semonkong and the villages along the way for the intervening 7 or 8 years. Finally
the fact that CFO selected the most expensive of the three alternatives indicates
that finding foreign assistance is not a serious constraint, and that in many cases
donors prefer to finance large-scale rather than smaller projects.
(f) It provides a grave example of CPO's non-responsiveness to letters. Assuming
that CPO had reasons for not supporting the self-help project, it at no time com-
municated them to the people concerned. It received at least 4 direct requests and
at least 7 copies of correspondence, and it reacted only once (its letter to the
Ministry of Works, which it failed to follow up). Thus at no time during this
period of about 4 years have FAPO or. the villagers been given any idea whatever of
CPO intentions regarding their request for assistance.
( . ' . / • • • • ' • . . •
(g) Nobody phoned CPO t o ask why.
DAVID HIRSCHMANN
